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1. Introduction  
There has been considerable attention given recently to the need for “family-friendly” workplace 
policies.1 Analysis of employer mandates, be they family leave, workplace safety, health coverage 
requirements, or the like, depends crucially on reliable estimates of changes in workplace wages, 
employment, and other outcomes. The costs of mandates are expected to be borne by employers and 
employees, with the incidence determined by relative labor demand and supply elasticities and workers’ 
valuation of the benefits. A special case is one in which a workforce values the benefits dollar-for-dollar 
and the full costs are shifted to workers according to their benefit valuation. Under these circumstances, 
there need not be a distortion in employment or a deadweight welfare loss (Summers 1989, Gruber 1994). 
Because mandates typically impact some groups of workers more than others, are implemented in some 
settings (e.g., states, countries) but not others, and are adopted at different times, evaluation studies often 
use difference-in-differences or triple-difference estimators to identify the treatment effects of such 
policies (e.g., Ruhm 1998; Baum 2003). 
This paper examines wage and employment transitions following implementation of California’s 
Paid Family Leave (CPFL) insurance program in July 2004, the first mandated paid family leave program 
in the U.S. The theoretical underpinnings and statistical methods used in our analysis are similar to those 
used in prior studies examining workplace mandates, with one notable difference. Rather than focusing on 
changes in wages and employment among the stock of incumbent employees, we examine wage offers 
among new hires and employment flows, the latter including the number of new hires, permanent 
separations, and extended leaves with return to work. Specifically, we examine changes in these outcomes 
following enactment of CPFL among young women in California relative to young men and older women 
within the state, and relative to young women and other workers elsewhere in the country. Data from the 
Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) (Abowd et al. 2009) are used to measure the earnings and 
employment of “stable” new hires, and provide information on separations and extended leaves, all by 
quarter, county, age, and sex.2  
Why the focus on new hires and other labor market flows? A limitation of existing studies is that 
wage and employment effects resulting from workplace mandates develop gradually over time. We 
should not expect employers to instantly move to a new equilibrium employment level and/or rapidly 
                                                 
1 For example, in June 2014 there was a White House Summit on Working Families and the President wrote an op-
ed on family friendly policies (Obama 2014). 
2 Previous analyses on mandates typically measure changes in wage and employment levels (stocks) by state and 
demographic group using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data (e.g., see Card (1992) on minimum wages and 
Gruber (1994) on health insurance pregnancy coverage). Recent papers by Rossin-Slater et al. (2013), Byker (2014), 
Baum and Ruhm (2013), and Das and Polachek (2014) use alternative data sets to examine various effects of 
California’s paid family leave. The focus of these papers differs substantially from our work, as discussed below.  
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change the demographic composition of their workforce following a mandate, nor do we expect to see 
substantive wage adjustments for an existing workforce. Although little short-run impact on incumbent 
employees (the intensive margin) is expected, the effects of the policy should be quickly observed among 
new hires (the extensive margin) and other employment flows. As explained subsequently, we expect to 
see small wage decreases among young women (the treated group) relative to other (untreated) workers, 
while relative employment for young women could decrease, remain constant, or increase, depending on 
the valuation of benefits and degree of cost shifting. To understand how universal paid leave affects 
market behavior, we need to examine not just hiring and earnings, but also changes in separations, recalls 
(extended leaves), and the demographic composition of employment.  
Although our focus is on paid family leave, the implications are broader, applying to any event, 
behavior, or policy that shifts labor market demand or supply. Even were a workplace mandate to have a 
substantial impact, we suggest that it is difficult to estimate the impact by measuring changes in 
employment levels and average wages, both heavily weighted by incumbents. A focus on new hire 
earnings and composition, along with employment flows, should allow researchers to detect the effects of 
workplace policies shortly following their implementation.3 
2. Overview of California paid family leave policy  
Overview/coverage. California’s Paid Family Leave (CPFL) policy was enacted August 30, 2002 
and took effect July 1, 2004. Prior to the 2004 implementation of CPFL, women had access to paid 
disability leave during pregnancy and shortly after birth. To understand the marginal effect of California’s 
paid family leave program, one must recognize how it interacts with pre-existing programs and how 
multiple policies are used in order to receive leave that is both job protected and paid. As described 
below, CPFL has been typically used to extend paid leave among mothers by six weeks. 
CPFL is administered by the California Employment Development Department (EDD), which also 
administers the State Disability Insurance (SDI) program (begun in 1977). SDI and CPFL are jointly 
financed by a mandatory payroll tax on employees, with no tax on employers. Both programs provide 
partial wage replacement. Coverage among private sector employees is nearly universal. Employees are 
required to participate if their employer has more than one employee and has paid an employee at least 
$100 in any quarter during a 12 month reference period. Self-employed and state/local workers are not 
automatically enrolled, although some can elect coverage. No proof of citizenship is required. 
Payroll tax financing. The SDI/CPFL employee tax rate and cap on total contributions have varied 
                                                 
3 Recent papers by Dube et al. (2013) and Gittings and Schmutte (2013) use the QWI to examine the effect of 
minimum wages on employment flows (separations and hires). 
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substantially across years to maintain funds to pay current benefits. As seen in Table 1, the payroll tax 
rate varied from 0.6% to 1.2% between 2003 and 2011, while the cap on payments varied from a low of 
$500 in 2007 to $1,120 in 2011.4 In 2011, the 1.2% employee SDI/CPFL contribution rate combined with 
a taxable wage ceiling of $93,316 to produce a maximum annual contribution of $1,120. The taxable 
wage base is adjusted, typically annually, to reflect state wage growth. 
SDI wage base and benefit calculation. SDI provides partial wage replacement, with benefits equal 
to 55% of workers’ wages up to a cap. The newer CPFL program uses the same benefit formula as does 
SDI. Workers unable to work due to a non-work-related illness or injury, including pregnancy, may be 
eligible for SDI benefits. The SDI benefit period is four weeks before the due date and six weeks 
postpartum for normal pregnancies, but up to eight weeks in the case of Caesarian births or other 
difficulties (the latter requiring doctor certification). The benefit amount is calculated using a wage base 
equal to the highest paid quarter during the 12 month reference period 5 to 17 months before the SDI 
disability claim (eligibility requires at least $300 in earnings during the 12 month reference period). 
Average SDI pregnancy claim benefits in FY 2011 were $398 per week, lasting on average 10.7 weeks 
(including time before and after birth). The 2011 benefits ranged from a floor of $50 to a ceiling of $987 
per week. Because of SDI, women had access to paid maternity leave decades before CPFL was enacted. 
CPFL description. CPFL was created for mothers (or fathers) to bond with their newborns, 
although it also provided benefits to workers to care for a seriously ill child, spouse, domestic partner, or 
for a newly adopted child or recently placed foster child.5 Although California was the first state to 
provide paid family leave, two others have followed with similarly structured programs.6 CPFL funds are 
administered jointly with SDI, employees covered by SDI also being eligible for CPFL benefits. 
Following receipt of six to eight postpartum weeks under SDI, a new mother is then eligible for up to six 
additional weeks of paid family leave using the same wage base and benefit formula described above for 
SDI. In FY 2011, the average CPFL payout was $488 a week for 5.3 weeks. Approximately two-thirds of 
women receiving SDI pregnancy benefits transition to CPFL benefits. 
                                                 
4 In 2003, prior to CPFL, the payment cap was $512. This was increased to $812 in 2004.  The cap fell to as low as 
$500 in 2007 and then rose sharply following the recession, to a high of $1,120 in 2011. Some but not all the data 
shown in Table 1 are available after 2011. 
5 In FY 2011, 87.3% of CPFL claims were for care of newborns. Effective July 1, 2014, the CPFL temporary 
disability program was expanded to include time off to care for a seriously ill grandparent, grandchild, sibling, or 
parent-in-law.  
6 New Jersey passed PFL in May 2008, began collecting taxes in January 2009, and began disbursements in July 
2009. Rhode Island’s Temporary Caregiver Insurance (TCI) Law, which began January 2014, provides four weeks 
of paid leave (with job protection) for bonding with a new child or for family or household member with a serious 
health condition. Washington passed a PFL bill in May 2007, planning to begin payouts in October 2009 and 
subsequently postponed to October 2012 and then October 2015. In 2013, legislation was passed that delays 
implementation until the legislature approves funding and program implantation (unlike the other three states, this 
program was to be funded through the state budget rather than employee payroll taxes).  
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Job protection vs. paid leave. Although providing partial pay replacement, neither SDI nor CPFL 
provides job protection. Job protection is in turn provided by state and federal laws guaranteeing unpaid 
leave.7 A combination of SDI, CPFL, other state programs, and the federal FMLA provides workers with 
a “package” of protected leave with partial wage replacement. And of course some employers may choose 
to provide paid maternity leave independent of any legal requirements.8 The most generous mandated 
package includes up to 28 weeks of job protection (up to 16 weeks of pregnancy disability covered by the 
state PDL concurrent with FMLA, plus 12 weeks protection from the CFRA postpartum) and 16-18 
weeks of partial wage replacement (4 weeks pregnancy and 6-8 weeks postpartum under SDI, plus 6 
weeks from CPFL).9 Although difficult to summarize, Figure 1 shows what is typically the maximum use 
of wage replacement (top half of figure) and job protection (bottom half) before and after child birth. 
Although both SDI and CPFL are available to covered employees, a substantial number claim 
benefits from only one of the programs. Receipt of CPFL but not SDI benefits may result from household 
financial constraints or company-provided time off during pregnancy and/or after birth. Among those who 
receive SDI pregnancy benefits, many do not elect to receive further benefits under CPFL once the SDI 
benefits are exhausted. In 2011, 65.5% of beneficiaries receiving SDI transitioned to CPFL. The decision 
not to claim CPFL payments can occur for several reasons. Some women may prefer to return to work or 
feel a financial need to receive full rather than partial pay. This should occur disproportionately in low 
income households that cannot easily bear the reduced income, among highly paid workers whose CPFL 
benefits are well below 55% of their usual pay due to the benefits cap, and among workers for whom 
promotion and earnings growth is dependent on a timely return to work. In addition, workers in small 
companies (fewer than fifty employees) are not covered by the FMLA’s job protection provision and may 
                                                 
7 The 1978 amendments to California’s State Fair Employment Practices Act addresses pregnancy discrimination 
and offers up to four months unpaid, job-protected leave for pregnancy-related disabilities. Pregnancy disability 
leave (PDL) specifically stipulates that the pregnancy must be a disability and cause the mother to be unable to work 
(either full or part time). A doctor’s note is required and the duration of the leave is up to the doctor. No benefits are 
paid and the period of leave ends with the birth of the child. Unpaid leave to care for a child following birth is 
covered by the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), which went into effect in 1992 and provides 12 weeks of 
unpaid, job-protected leave for private sector employees who have worked the previous 12 months for at least 1,250 
hours. Establishments with fewer than 50 employees within a 75 mile radius of the worksite are exempt. The Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was signed into federal law a year later with similar provisions and exclusions. 
Unlike CFRA however, FMLA can be taken both during pregnancy and after the child’s birth.  
8 BLS National Compensation Survey (NCS) data from the BLS shows that the overall coverage of paid family 
leave in the U.S. private sector was 11% in 2012, compared to just 2% in 1992-93 (the latter figure is exclusively for 
maternity leave), with higher coverage for full-time workers and those in large establishments (Van Giezen 2013). 
For earlier estimates of paid maternity leave compiled from CPS supplements, see Klerman and Leibowitz (1994). 
Byker (2014) provides a nice discussion, coupled with nation-wide evidence on paid leave compiled from several 
years of data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  
9 There are additional restrictions for how benefits can be utilized. For example, under some circumstances, the 
FMLA must be used concurrently during the PDL protected disability.  
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risk loss of their job with a lengthy maternity leave. Even absent risk of job loss, a new mother may 
choose to return to her job at a small company if her employer is highly dependent on her contribution.  
In short, the principal effect of California’s 2004 Paid Family Leave program has been to extend 
the availability of paid maternity leave by six weeks. Although this is a substantive expansion of benefits, 
the policy did not involve a shift from no mandated paid leave to its current level. Given the incremental 
nature of the program, identifying CPFL’s impact using standard data and methods (i.e., measuring 
changes in wage and employment levels) is likely to prove difficult. Focusing instead on new hire wages 
and employment flows should enhance the chances of an informative analysis.  
3. Previous empirical analyses of California paid family leave and the labor market 
We are aware of five studies (one published) that use household data to analyze various effects of 
CPFL on labor market outcomes.10 Espinola-Arrendondo and Mondal (2010) examine CPFL employment 
effects using the March 2001-2007 Current Population Survey (CPS). They compare female employment 
changes in California following CPFL relative to changes for women in other states with and without 
expanded FMLA provisions. Using numerous combinations of treatment and comparison groups, the 
authors conclude that all their treatment estimates are “both economically and statistically insignificant.” 
One possibility is that the effects of CPFL are close to zero. But another is that CPFL effects are likely to 
first show up in data on new hires and not incumbent employees. Because of the relatively small sample 
sizes of treated employees in the CPS and the time required for wage and employment effects to be 
reflected across the labor force, one would need to measure labor market outcomes using data many years 
beyond implementation of the policy. Such an approach risks contamination from other factors affecting 
labor outcomes. 
The published paper by Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) has as its focus the effect of CPFL on time off 
from work among young mothers with children. Their principal data source is the March CPS. Although 
the authors faced difficulties in identifying those who are and are not treated by CPFL (time of a child’s 
birth cannot be precisely measured), they provide convincing evidence that CPFL increased time off from 
                                                 
10 There is a far larger literature examining the effects of paid family leave outside the U.S., some of it focused on 
women’s labor supply and some on health, education and other outcomes for mothers and children. Papers by Baker 
and Milligan (2008, 2010) and Baker et al. (2008) use Canadian data and focus on mothers’ employment and early 
child development outcomes. Effects on child well-being are generally small. Using German data, Dustmann and 
Schönberg (2012) focus on child outcomes, while Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) examine mothers’ labor market 
outcomes. Using changes in laws governing parental leave in Austria, Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) examine the 
effect of leave extensions on fertility and return to work, while Lalive et al (2014) focus on mothers’ work careers 
and differentiate the effects from benefits versus those from job protection. Dahl et al (2013) provide a critical 
assessment of recent expansions in the length of paid maternity leave in Norway, concluding that the expansion 
increased the length of leave but was costly and regressive, while having minimal effects on a range of labor market 
and child outcomes. Carneiro et al. (2011) provide a more positive assessment of the Norwegian system’s long run 
impact on children’s subsequent education and earnings, although they do not compare benefits to costs.  
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work among mothers of young children. Although not the principal focus of their paper, the authors also 
provide estimates of earnings and employment effects of CPFL. They conclude that there were no 
changes in employment following CPFL, but that there appeared to be an increase in work hours (hours 
last week and in the prior year), conditional on employment. The authors note that future study is needed. 
Byker (2014) examines the effects of paid family leave in California and New Jersey on women’s 
labor force interruptions following birth of a child, using monthly longitudinal data from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Data from the two treatment states are used jointly, New York, 
Florida, and Texas form the comparison group states. She finds little effect from paid family leave on job 
attachment among college-educated mothers, those most likely to have access to employer-provided paid 
leave absent a legal mandate. For mothers with less than a college degree, she concludes that paid leave 
reduces exits lasting less than six months, while having little effect on exits longer than six months.11  
Baum and Ruhm (2013) use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) to examine 
CPFL effects on use of leave surrounding child birth and subsequent labor market outcomes. They 
conclude that an average mother’s use of leave increased by about 2.4 weeks, typically at about the time 
that disability benefits were exhausted. Fathers took a short amount of time off immediately following 
birth. Baum and Ruhm find increased work probabilities for mothers nine to twelve months after birth and 
increased weeks and hours worked (and possibly wage increases) in the child’s second year of life.  
Das and Polachek (2014) use CPS data aggregated to the state level and use difference-in-
difference techniques to identify CPFL effects on labor force participation (LFP) and unemployment 
among young women in California. They conclude that CPFL increases LFP among young women, but 
also increased their unemployment and unemployment duration. Similar tests based on placebo laws were 
generally insignificant, strengthening the authors’ confidence that their results are robust and causal.  
Although the focus and approaches by these authors are quite different, Baum and Ruhm (2013), 
Das and Polachek (2014), and (to a lesser extent) Byker (2014) each conclude that CPFL increased labor 
force attachment among young women. Their results can be interpreted as broadly consistent with the 
evidence we present on job flows. We find that CPFL is associated with higher separations among young 
women, but that it also leads to increases in new hires and rates of recall (return to the same employer 
following time off a payroll for at least three months). One interpretation of such evidence is that 
universal paid family leave increased the mobility of young women (i.e., reduced job lock) and led to 
efficiency-enhancing resorting in the labor market. 
                                                 
11 Using public-use SIPP files, Byker observes flows into and out of employment, but does not know if employment 
is with the same employer. She states that she plans to access confidential SIPP files matched to administrative 
records, thus allowing her to measure employment and earnings histories with the same employers.  
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4. The expected effects of the CPFL mandate on wages, employment, and turnover 
The costs of CPFL are nominally borne by employees through a payroll tax. The costs are attached 
to all employees, but with lower average costs per hour and zero marginal cost among those with earnings 
above the tax threshold (about $93 thousand in 2011, an amount unlikely to be exceeded by many young 
workers). The payroll tax costs from CPFL are independent of whether a worker is likely to use and/or 
values paid family leave. Because the payroll tax is levied at nearly all California establishments, labor 
supply is inelastic and thus cannot readily be shifted to employers (and/or consumers) in those product 
markets where output prices are determined nationally or internationally. 
Apart from the payroll costs paid by workers, employers face “disruption costs” resulting from 
time off the job among employees. Leave taking reduces output and/or requires added hiring. Increased 
uncertainty as to whether and when a worker will return also adds cost. Such uncertainty existed prior to 
CPFL, but six weeks of additional leave could increase the uncertainty.  
The expected general equilibrium wage and employment effects resulting from CPFL can be 
evaluated using the demand and supply “tax incidence” approach (Summers 1989). Effectively, any costs 
can be thought of as placing a “tax wedge” between labor demand (and the gross wage to which 
employers respond) and labor supply (and the net wage to which workers respond). To the extent that 
market level labor supply is more inelastic than labor demand, more costs are shifted to employees. The 
statutory payroll cost facing employees from CPFL shifts labor supply upward for all workers. The 
valuation of such benefits by young women (or others) then shifts their labor supply outward. 
“Disruption” costs facing employers cause a downward shift in demand for young women.  
The demand and supply shifts described above are shown in Figure 2, separately for young women 
(the treated group) and for other (non-treated) workers, with the assumption that the two groups of 
workers are imperfect substitutes (modified subsequently).12 The non-treated “other workers” have an 
unambiguous increase in wages (pre-tax) and decrease in employment due to their upward shift in supply 
due to the payroll tax. For young women, wages unambiguously decline as long the valuation of leave 
exceeds their payroll costs (i.e., if S2 is to the right of S1). A decrease in demand due to disruption costs 
(shift D1 to D2) would further reduce wages among young women. Employment can rise or fall from the 
pre-mandate level, depending on the size of the supply increase and demand decrease. In short, in the case 
                                                 
12 Throughout the paper we use the term “young women” and “treated” synonymously. That said, the proportion of 
paid family leave taking for bonding with children by women has fallen from over 80 percent female during the 
early years used in our analysis to about 70 percent currently (see Table 1). We do not have data on how duration of 
PFL differs among male and female recipients, although evidence in Baum and Ruhm (2013) indicates that father’s 
leave time is brief and immediately follows a child’s birth.  
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where young women and other workers are imperfect substitutes, wages for young women 
unambiguously decrease relative to other workers, while relative employment may increase or decrease.  
It is important to note that the effects of the CPFL mandate are not independent of how financing is 
structured. CPFL benefits are paid through a state agency funded by a mandatory payroll tax. 
Alternatively, imagine a program that mandates employers to directly provide and fund paid leave for 
their employees, or a program in which paid leave is funded by a state payroll tax whose rate is fully 
experience rated. In these two alternative scenarios, the cost to a business would differ according to the 
frequency of use. All else the same, employers would prefer to hire workers least likely to use paid leave, 
producing employment and wage differentials due to demand shifts for worker groups with different 
expected use of leave. CPFL, however, has a financing cost that is independent of use at the firm level, 
given that payroll taxes are not experience rated.13 Ignoring scheduling and productivity (disruption) costs 
that may accompany longer leaves, employers then have no economic incentive to select employees who 
are less or more likely to collect paid leave from the state fund.  
Given the funding mechanism and absent disruption costs, CPFL affects employers’ choice of 
employee mix only to the extent that it produces changes in relative market wages. As seen in Figure 2, 
labor supply shifts inward for all workers due to the payroll tax costs, while shifting outward for workers 
based on their valuation of CPFL benefits. The resulting shift in aggregate labor supply is indeterminate. 
We subsequently show that even with full shifting of CPFL payroll tax costs to young women, the level 
of the tax is sufficiently small such that its effect on relative wages is minimal. Substantive negative wage 
effects for young women would require sizable disruption costs (the decrease from D1 to D2) and a high 
valuation of paid leave benefits (the decrease from S1' to S2) supply increase).  
If there existed a unified labor market in which young women and other workers were perfect 
substitutes, there could be no wage difference between equally productive young women and other 
workers.14 No shifting of payroll costs to young women relative to other workers would be possible. Were 
we to observe a relative wage decrease for young women in such a market, it is most likely due to a 
downward shift in labor demand from disruption costs attached to family leave. This special case in 
which young women and other workers are perfect substitutes, with PFL payroll taxes independent of 
firms’ use of leave, helps inform expectations about real-world labor markets where young women 
compete with other workers in many, but far from all, markets. In the unified market case aggregate labor 
supply may increase or decrease depending on whether the outward supply shift from valuation of family 
                                                 
13 This is in contrast to unemployment insurance and employer-based private health insurance plans, each of which 
is at least partially experience rated. 
14 In contrast to the separate demand and supply diagrams shown in Figure 1, a unified market would have a single 
aggregate labor supply curve that is the horizontal sum of supply among young women and other worker groups.  
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leave is greater or less than the inward shift due to payroll taxes. The market wage for all workers may 
increase or decrease, but there should be no change in relative wages absent disruption costs. With a 
unified labor market and no disruption costs, employment for men and older women should decrease 
slightly due to the aggregate supply shift from the payroll tax (this assumes they place little value on paid 
leave). Young women’s labor supply is likely to have a net shift outward due to a valuation of family 
leave benefits (financed primarily by other employees) that exceeds their small tax cost; thus increasing 
equilibrium employment. Only with a downward demand shift due to disruption costs should we see a 
relative decrease in wages for young women, while their employment may increase or decrease 
depending on the relative sizes of the shifts. 
In addition to examining wage and employment effects, based primarily on evidence on new hire 
flows and new hire earnings, we examine evidence on separations and extended leaves (referred to as 
“recalls” in our data set). Doing so provides a broader picture of how paid leave affects labor market 
outcomes. Such evidence can strengthen (or weaken) confidence in our empirical evidence since labor 
market flows are not independent of each other. For example, if paid family leave has an impact on 
separations, hiring will also be affected. An increase in short- and medium-term separations among young 
women may increase hiring of young women who perform these job tasks. The effect of CPFL on 
permanent separations (and thus hiring) is ambiguous. On the one hand, longer leave may prevent what 
would otherwise be quits. On the other hand, universal paid family leave could reduce job lock and 
increase job mobility among young women.  
Evidence of reduced job lock and increased churn following CPFL would provide empirical 
support for a standard argument made for mandated benefits; that such policies may correct market 
failures due to asymmetric information and adverse selection (Summers 1989). Assume that for the 
overall economy and most firms, the benefits of paid family leave exceed their costs. Absent market 
failure, employers would provide such benefits, with the costs shifted to workers through wages that 
decrease according to workers’ use and valuation of benefits. While individual workers know whether 
they are likely to use family leave (and whether they value the option to do so), employers have less 
complete information. Firms that introduce paid family leave will face adverse selection and attract “high-
leave” (high-cost) workers. Knowing this, employers are reluctant to offer such benefits. The market 
would then evolve into one where there exist high-leave/low-wage firms with paid leave and low-
leave/high-wage firms without leave.  
Starting from an equilibrium in which job matches and equilibrium wages are determined based in 
part on company leave policies, the introduction of universal paid leave unambiguously adds churn to the 
labor market following its introduction. With universal leave, the wages of firms that provided paid leave 
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prior to the mandate are too low, while wages at firms that had not provided leave are too high. Worker 
turnover should increase as workers sort on wages and attributes other than paid leave (sorting based on 
paid leave would continue at firms with benefits exceeding the mandate). Thus, in response to 
implementation of CPFL, we should see relatively higher levels of separations and new hires for workers 
who highly value paid leave. Following the post-CPFL resorting, we suspect that long-run turnover rates 
for young women will remain higher than rates prior to the mandate. With paid family leave now 
universal in California, search frictions are lower (i.e., it is easier for young women to find employers that 
are a good match) and equilibrium levels of job churn are likely to be higher.  
5. How large an effect might CPFL have on wages? A back-of-the-envelope exercise 
In the previous section, we discussed why the payroll costs of CPFL should be shifted to young 
women if they are imperfect substitutes with other workers, whereas all workers will bear the costs if the 
two groups of workers are perfect substitutes. To assess the plausibility of relative wage change estimates 
in our empirical analysis, in this section we ask the question: What effect might we expect CPFL to have on 
wages if the full costs are borne by young women? A back-of-the-envelope calculation is informative. 
Although we do not expect full shifting, such a calculation provides an upper-bound on the expected wage 
changes seen from CPFL’s payroll tax.  
Ideally we would like to account for the full costs of the CPFL program. Our calculation incorporates 
only the direct costs of the program (i.e., leave benefits), fully funded from payroll taxes with costs borne 
by workers and possibly firm owners and consumers. We observe the payroll tax rates (which vary by year) 
and revenues collected to fund the system. Hence we have good information on the direct cost of paid leave 
across the California labor market and, based on the payroll tax rates and CPFL expenditures, the costs as a 
percentage of (taxable) earnings. As seen in Table 1, the overall payroll tax rate for the state disability 
program has been about 1.0%, but most of this is used to fund state disability programs in place prior to 
paid family leave. The initial increase in the tax rate that accompanied the introduction of CPFL was about 
0.3%, but a large portion of this was used to start up the CPFL administrative structure. Longer run, paid 
family leave benefits account for a small share of total benefits of the combined SDI/PFL fund, 11.1% in 
2012 (the most recent year for which we had data). In our calculation shown below, we initially assume the 
payroll tax cost of CPFL is 0.2%, an amount halfway between the 0.3% rise seen during the years of our 
analysis and the 0.11% of payroll needed to currently fund CPFL benefits (i.e., 11% of a total payroll tax of 
about 1.0%). The calculation can be readily changed to reflect a payroll cost higher or lower than 0.2%. 
To what extent would nominal wages need to decrease for young women and increase for other 
workers to fully shift the payroll tax burden? Letting C be the total payroll tax cost for a workforce, Y the 
total taxable earnings for that workforce, t the administrative payroll tax rate used for CPFL, and Pf and 
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(1-Pf) the shares of taxable payroll for young women and others (the treated and non-treated), 
respectively, the total payroll cost across a workforce would be: 
C = tY = Pf (tY) + (1-Pf)(tY). 
We wish to solve for the percentage reduction in relative earnings required to load all costs C onto young 
women. We designate this “tax” rate as tf, which collapses to the simple relationship: 
tf = t/Pf , 
where, as above, t = is the statutory tax rate and Pf the share of taxable earnings among young women. As 
an example, setting t at 0.2% (.002) and assuming that young women account for 20% of total taxable 
payroll (i.e., Pf = 0.2), the effective tax rate tf for young women would be 1.0%. This 1.0% is made up of 
two parts, the 0.2% payroll tax plus a 0.8% reduction in wages. The effective tax rate for other workers is 
zero, implying that their wage increases by (up to) 0.2% to fully offset the payroll tax.15 With full shifting, 
the relative wage differential between young women and others in the (California) labor market would be 
equal to tf or 1.0% (young women’s wages fall 0.8% and others’ wages rise 0.2%). Were one comparing  
young women in California relative to young women (or others) outside of California, the differential 
would be 0.8% rather than 1.0% since the comparison group is not levied the payroll tax.  
Using CPS data for California in the two years prior to CPFL, we calculate the share of taxable 
payroll among young women. We obtain an estimate of 21.5%. For the portion of the total 1% SDI 
payroll tax that covers PFL costs, we use the value 0.111 based on the 2012 value of 11.1%. Thus, the 
implied relative wage effect from full shifting would be t/Pf  = 0.111/0.215 = 0.52%, or half of one 
percent.16 Such a “back-of-the-envelope” estimate is imprecise, but does provide a rough idea of the 
magnitude of wage effects that might result from CPFL. The suggestion is that the relative wage effects 
resulting from the direct costs of CPFL (the payroll tax) should be small – well below 1% even with full 
shifting. And this small amount may provide an upper bound. To the extent that young women and other 
workers are close substitutes, relative wages change little. Likewise, if the “young women” versus “other 
workers” delineation does not align closely with those who do and do not value paid leave benefits, then 
cost shifting will be reduced. That said, demand shifts resulting from CPFL disruption costs will generate 
                                                 
15 The “up to” 0.2% reflects the fact that high earners will have some of their earnings not taxed, lowering the 
average rate across all earnings. For young women, few would have annual earnings above the cap, making the 
calculation of tf  relatively accurate. 
16 Using CPS data, we have the ability to exclude each individual’s earnings above the taxable cap from the 
denominator in calculating young women’s share of taxable payroll. Absent the exclusion, the estimated share of 
young women’s earnings to total payroll is 12.1%, as compared to 21.5% of taxable payroll. Using our QWI 
administrative earnings data, we obtain an estimated 10.9% share of young women’s earnings to total payroll, 
similar to the CPS estimate.  
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relative wage differences not included in our calculation.17  
Causal wage effects on the order of 1% or less are nearly impossible to reliably identify with 
standard data sets, in particular if we are looking at wage levels (rather than new hire wages) and using 
data sets based on relatively small samples, as is the case with, say, CPS analyses of CPFL. Even with our 
data set, which provides administrative earnings records for new hires by gender, age group, county, and 
quarter, obtaining reliable estimates of such small wage effects is likely to prove difficult.  
6. Data description: The Quarterly Workforce Indicators 
The earnings and employment flow variables central to our analysis are obtained from the 
Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) database. The QWI is publicly available data derived from the 
Local Employment Dynamics (LED) data program, which in turn is built on the confidential Longitudinal 
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program. The LEHD is based on state unemployment insurance 
data and contains individual level quarterly earnings data that matches workers to firms. Crucial for our 
analysis, the LEHD identifies when workers begin at a new firm and records their earnings. The data rely 
on state participation and while all states have now signed on to participate, five did not provide complete 
data over our period of analysis, which begins in 2002.18 The QWI provides employment and earnings 
measures at the state, metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and county levels. Based on individual level 
LEHD data, these measures are aggregated into narrowly-defined demographic categories including age, 
sex, ethnicity, race and education within the geographic area. The data cover 98% of all private, non-
agricultural employment in the states for which data are available.19  
In the analysis that follows, we utilize measures of the average monthly earnings for new hires in a 
quarter, and the number of new hires, separations, and recalls, within tightly defined sex-age groupings, 
all observed at the county by quarter level.20 We examine these outcomes both in levels and in shares for 
young women. In results shown, we use data for 2002:3 through 2004:2 as the pre-CPFL period and 
2004:3 through 2006:2 as the post-treatment period. Thus we have the same number and composition of 
quarters before and after implementation of the law in July 2004. Examination of the data suggested no 
                                                 
17 We cannot rule out the possibility that employer and employee expectations of future costs (both indirect costs 
and worker payroll costs) following CPFL’s implementation in 2004 exceeded the eventual true costs, thus 
increasing wage effects during our estimation period. 
18 Data for California is available starting in 1991. In the analysis that follows, five states are excluded from 
analyses. Massachusetts provided no data during our period of analysis, while data for Arizona, Arkansas, 
Mississippi, and New Hampshire were provided for some but not all quarters. 
19 For a full description of the QWI and its production, see Abowd et al. (2008). The imputed data on education are 
problematic and not used in our analysis. 
20 The age groupings identified in the QWI are 14-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and 65-99.  We do 
not use QWI cells by education, race, or ethnicity since many cell sizes would be tiny and suppressed. These 
attributes change little over our time period, while state and county fixed effects account for cross-sectional 
differences. 
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apparent effect of the policy between its passage and eventual implementation in July 2004.21 We were 
reluctant to reach back to earlier years because the “tech bubble” had substantial effects through 2001, in 
particular on the earnings and employment of young men in California, with relatively smaller effects on 
young women and older workers.22  
The unit of analysis is at the demographic-location-quarter level where demographic groups are 
defined by sex-age group categories and location is at the county level. These data allow us to measure 
average monthly earnings of new employees for the first full quarter in which they are employed. We are 
able to distinguish between all new hires and all new “stable” hires, where stable hires are defined as 
employees who have worked at least a full quarter at the firm where they were hired, as evidenced by 
their presence on that firm’s UI records for three consecutive quarters. Our analysis includes employment 
and earnings data only for stable hires. Among other things, the focus on stable hires largely avoids 
including hires of temporary replacement workers at non-representative wages.23  
The narrowly defined demographic and geographic groupings over time in the QWI are ideally 
suited to help identify treatment effects from California’s paid family leave policy. If CPFL affects 
employment and earnings, then we expect this to be most evident in relative new hire employment and 
new hire earnings among young women in California. The QWI panel allows us to examine changes that 
occurred following CPFL among young female treatment groups in California, as compared to changes 
for other demographic groups within California, as well as compared to young women and other 
demographic groups outside California.  
In order to provide some feel for the QWI data, Table 2 shows average new hire monthly earnings, 
and the average monthly number of stable new hires, separations, and recalls (extended leaves), each for 
young (ages 19-34) women in California and in all states, other than California and the five states without 
complete QWI data during these years (Arizona, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and New 
Hampshire). For each of these four outcomes we also provide relative (or share) measure for young 
women. Specifically, we show the ratio of young women’s new hire earnings to average earnings for all 
new hires, and the shares of all new hires, separations, and recalls who are young women. These latter 
                                                 
21 This is not surprising. As shown in Appelbaum and Milkman (2011), even after passage of the law, Californians 
had a low recognition of the law’s existence and content. Recognition has grown over time, particularly among those 
most likely to use it.  
22 Having said this, our basic results are relatively insensitive to extensions in the treatment and control periods or to 
omitting data for the quarters immediately before and after implementation. 
23 QWI data are reported with a lag in order that stable hires can be identified retrospectively. In the most narrowly 
defined groupings, the QWI suppresses data in order to maintain confidentiality. State level data are never 
suppressed for the sex-age categories. Suppressed county level sex-age data cells are simply dropped. A natural use 
of the QWI is to use it to estimate employment and earnings levels (“stocks”) as well as new hire flows. Levels data 
for this analysis, however, has the disadvantage that quarterly payrolls can include workers who began or returned 
from family leave and have low earnings due to time off.  
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four measures are shown for both the periods before and following implementation of California’s paid 
family leave.  
Focusing first on the change in log earnings among new hires, we see that both in California and 
other states, new hire earnings among young women grew somewhat more slowly than for other groups. 
For example, in California, the change in real earnings was 1.8 percent, similar to that for young men (2.4 
percent) but less than the 4.5 among older women and 4.7 percent among older men.24 New stable hires 
among young women in California increased by nearly 7 percent between the two periods, as compared to 
3 percent for young men and 4-5 percent for older women and men. Also noteworthy is that new hire 
earnings in California grew over time at a considerably faster rate than outside the state for all 
demographic groups (overall rates being 3.1 versus 2.2 percent). The results of our subsequent analysis, 
which indicate little relative change in earnings, but with increased hiring, separations, and recalls for 
young women due to CPFL, can be gleaned to at least a limited degree from the information in Table 2.  
7. Method of analysis 
As evident in the summary statistics shown in Table 2, there are three major sources of variation 
that can be exploited to identify the impact of CPFL on young women in California – time, demographic 
group, and location. We begin by setting up a simple difference-in-differences (DD) model that uses 
demographic variation within California over time to identify the impact on new hires, new hire earnings, 
separations, and recalls. Then we progress to a model that includes data from other states, thus utilizing 
geographic variation in demographic differences over time to identify estimated treatment effects on 
young women in California.25 
Consider first the following simple econometric specifications, which serve as the basis for our 
analysis of the labor market impacts of the CPFL within California. 
ln(𝑌𝑑𝑞𝑐) =  𝛽𝑇(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞 x   𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑑) + 𝛿𝑑 + 𝛾𝑞+ 𝛼𝑐 + 𝜖𝑑𝑞𝑐    (1) 
                                                 
24 Earnings are in 2010 dollars. In the paper we refer to the change in the log of mean earnings as the percentage 
change. It measures a percentage change in earnings with an intermediate base in the denominator and has the 
advantage of being invariant to the base. Of course, the difference in the log of mean earnings is not identical to the 
difference in the means of log earnings. 
25 Our initial analysis used as the control group just the four SDI states (Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode 
Island) whose disability programs provided partial wage replacement benefits for pregnancy, but not paid family 
leave, as was the case in California prior to its implementation of CPFL in 2004. Placebo tests convinced us that the 
SDI states (in particular, New York) provided a questionable control group for the immediate years around CPFL. 
This may have stemmed in part from introduction of state minimum wage increases beyond the federal minimum in 
all four of these states during our estimation period, increases most likely to affect young workers. There were no 
federal or California increases in minimum wages during these years. As a robustness check on the results shown in 
the paper, we accounted for all state-specific minimum wage changes. No substantive changes between those results 
and the results reported were found. We thank Ian Schmutte for providing information on state-by-quarter changes 
in minimum wages (see Gittings and Schmutte 2013).  
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In these specifications only data from California is used. In equation (1) the unit of observation is at the 
demographic-quarter-county level with ln (𝑌𝑑𝑞𝑐) representing one of the four log outcome measures – 
average monthly new hire earnings, total new hires, separations, and recalls (extended leaves), each 
measured for a given demographic group (d), in a given quarter (q), and in a given county (c). The 
coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝑇, which measures the impact (i.e. treatment) on young-female outcomes 
following implementation of CPFL. The variable Post is an indicator variable equal to one for all 
observations in or after the third quarter of 2004, after CPFL went into effect.26 The variable Young Fem 
is an indicator variable equal to one for women in the 19-21, 22-24 and 25-34 age categories.27 𝛿𝑑 and 𝛾𝑞 
represent full sets of demographic group and quarter indicator variables to account for time invariant 
differences between demographic groups and common shocks that hit all demographic groups in a given 
quarter, plus county fixed effects. From this specification, we can extract estimates for CPFL treatment 
effects on young women relative to both young men and older women in California.  
Equation 2 presents a DD model that expands the data to include other states, but restricts the 
comparison group and sample to observations for young women. Including other states (using county 
observations) allows us to directly compare changes to hiring and wage offers for young women in 
California with young women in states not impacted by CPFL.  
ln(𝑌𝑞𝑐) =  𝛽𝑇(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞 x 𝐶𝐴) + 𝛾𝑞 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝜖𝑞𝑐     (2) 
In equation (2), 𝛽𝑇  provides an estimate of log differences in new hires and new hire earnings for young 
women in California following CPFL, as compared to outcomes for young women in other states, 
conditioned on fixed effects for quarter q and county c. Equation (2) is estimated using county as the unit 
of observation, thus providing a comparison of California counties with counties in other states. Use of 
state observations provides highly similar results. 
Finally, we extract estimated treatment effects from a more general triple-diff model that includes 
all counties across California, all states and all demographic groups, but now identifies 𝛽𝑇 off the 
comparison of time changes in new hires and earnings (among other outcomes) for young women relative 
to other demographic groups in California counties compared to these same relative changes over time for 
young women in counties in other states. It takes the form  
ln(𝑌𝑑𝑞𝑐) =  𝛽𝑇(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞 x 𝐶𝐴 x  𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑑) + 𝛿𝑑𝑐 + 𝛾𝑞𝑠 + 𝛼𝑑𝑞 + 𝜖𝑑𝑞𝑐, (3) 
                                                 
26 In preliminary analysis, we failed to find a separate passage effect.  
27 These are the age groupings that are most likely to be impacted by the CPFL. Births per 1,000 women in 2004 
were 20.1 for 15-17 year olds; 66.2, 96.3, 110.5, and 97.7 for age groups 18-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 (groups close in 
age to our treatment group aged 19-34); and 46.5 and 10.1 for women 35-39 and 40-44 (Martin et al. 2011, Table 4). 
We include separate demographic fixed effects for the detailed age groups, but “treatment effect” estimates are for 
the combined 19-34 age group of young women.  
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where the variables 𝛿𝑑𝑐, 𝛾𝑞𝑠 and 𝛼𝑑𝑞𝑐 represent full sets of county-demographic, quarter-state (with s 
designating state), and demographic group-quarter indicator variables to control for time invariant 
differences between county-demographic groups as well as shocks to demographic groups and states that 
occur in a given quarter.28  
The inclusion of these large sets of indicator variables effectively controls for many of the worker 
differences that vary across demographic groups, counties, and years. Consider education, a crucial 
determinant of new hire earnings. If young women in California have different levels of education than 
other demographic-county combinations these differences will be picked up by 𝛿𝑑𝑐 as long as they are 
time invariant over the estimation period. Furthermore, if county education levels or demographic group 
education levels are changing over time these changes will be picked up by 𝛾𝑞𝑠 and 𝛼𝑑𝑞 respectively.  
County rather than state level results naturally provide greater variation to the outcome variables of 
interest and are likely to provide more precise estimates. There are two minor disadvantages. First, the 
county models become large given the substantial number of interaction variables required in fixed effects 
models. Second, county data are somewhat noisier than state data. Indeed, the QWI does not report data 
for very small data cells in order to insure confidentiality (this involves a tiny proportion of total county-
by-demographic observations). That said, the noise is on the left-hand side and thus unlikely to bias 
estimates. All of our analyses of new hires and new hire earnings weight observations by the number of 
new hires for which the observed employment or earnings is measured. This has the effect of blowing up 
the sample to be representative of the full population of new hires and gives relatively low weights to 
observations likely to be the noisiest. Separation, recall, and employment regressions are weighted by 
total (rather than new hire) employment. 
8. Estimates of CPFL treatment effects on new hire earnings and employment flows 
8.1  Double difference estimates using within California analysis 
Before discussing our preferred triple difference specification, we first consider simpler, but less 
informative, double difference estimates laid out in equations (1) and (2). All analyses provide estimates 
of “treatment” effects from CPFL on new hire earnings, new hire employment, separations, and recalls 
among young (ages 19-34) women. In this subsection, Table 3 provides results from within-California 
analyses based on changes in outcomes between the quarters prior to and following implementation of 
CPFL, as shown in equation (1). Observations are at the quarter by county by demographic group level. 
Panel A compares changes in outcomes (in log levels) for young women compared to older women within 
                                                 
28 Specifications using fixed effects based on more disaggregated geographic categories proved computationally 
unworkable despite access to the considerable resources of Cornell’s Social Science Gateway. For those regressions 
where we were able to use the full set of interactive county fixed effects, results were highly similar to those shown.  
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California. Panel B does likewise using younger men as the comparison group, while Panel C compares 
young women to all demographic groups within the state (other than young women). Included are fixed 
effects for quarter, county, and demographic group (i.e., sex by detailed age dummies). Standard errors 
are clustered at the county-by-demographic group level.  
Treatment effect estimates shown in Table 3 using the within-state analysis suggest a drop in new 
hire earnings of young women relative to these groups, with estimates that range from 1.3 to 2.0 percent, 
far larger than expected given our tiny “back-of-the-envelope” guesstimates of wage decline given full 
shifting.29 Skepticism regarding the within-state wage results are reinforced by our summary statistics in 
Table 2 showing that wage growth for young women between the pre-CPFL and post-CPFL periods was 
lower than for all workers not only in California (0.018 vs. 0.031) but also in our comparison group states 
(0.010 vs. 0.022).  
Estimates on within-state worker labor market flows (hires, separations, and recalls) among young 
women appear more informative, each indicating substantive and significant positive effects from paid 
family leave. Examining these flows jointly is important. Taken in isolation, an increase in young female 
new hires of between 1.4% and 2.4% is surprising, until one observes that separations also increase 
substantially (at the aggregate level, hiring and separations tend to move together). Particularly interesting 
is the estimate of a roughly 4 percent increase in recalls. In short, the within-state analysis suggests that 
the introduction of paid family leave led to more separations (i.e., workers not on the payroll for at least 
three months) among young women. But we also see a relatively high rate of recall; i.e., individuals 
observed on a firm’s payroll in a given quarter t who had not been there in quarter t-1, but who had been 
on that same firm’s payroll in quarters t-2, t-3, or t-4. The suggestion is that paid family leave led to more 
separations and extended leaves for young women bonding with their newborns, but that there was little 
effect on the overall composition of the workforce as some women returned to the same employer (i.e., 
recalls) and there were also higher levels of new hires, some of whom may have permanently separated 
from their previous employers following family leave.  
8.2  Double difference estimates using across state analysis for young women 
The prior within-California results are informative, but cannot rule out the possibility that young 
women as a whole, regardless of whether they were in California, might have been experiencing 
differences in labor outcomes relative to other demographic groups for reasons unrelated to CPFL. The 
across-state double difference specification shown in Table 4 compares young women in California to 
                                                 
29 That said, relative wage penalties should be slightly higher using the within-California comparison groups since 
theory predicts a slight increase in wages for California workers not valuing PFL coupled with small negative wage 
effects for young women.  
  
18 
young women in other states to account for this possibility, as seen in equation (2). Included are fixed 
effects for quarter and county, with standard errors clustered at the county level. While controlling for 
changes that are occurring to young women across the country, this specification has the disadvantage of 
not controlling for economic conditions in California that differ from the rest of the country, differences 
evident in Table 2. Using young women in other states as the control group yields similar results for hires, 
separations and recalls, but indicates an increase of about 1 percent in new hire earnings attributable to 
CPFL. We do not lend strong credence to these results as they are likely picking up overall improvements 
and growth in California’s economy that were not experienced in the rest of the country. However, they 
are worth reporting as they further bolster the need for a triple difference specification that controls for 
changes occurring both within and across states. 
8.2  Triple difference analysis across states using multiple demographic groups 
Rather than examine CPFL wage and employment effects based on either comparisons within 
California or comparisons of young women across states, we now turn to our preferred analysis in which 
the experience of young women in California is compared to those of other young women elsewhere in 
the U.S., each being relative to other demographic groups within their respective states. To do so, we 
move toward the triple-difference evaluation method shown in equation (3).  
Before turning to our primary results (shown subsequently in Table 6), we first examine the effects 
of CPFL on the traditional dependent variables, overall employment and average earnings levels (i.e., the 
stocks versus flows comparison referred to in our title). As discussed earlier, CPFL-induced labor market 
changes are unlikely to be picked up using levels of employment and earnings, which are driven mainly 
by incumbent workers and adjust slowly over time. Panels A and B of Table 5 present the results of the 
triple-difference specification in equation (3) using average monthly earnings and employment levels as 
the dependent variables. Results are reported for both workers with stable employment (those who have 
been at the firm for at least three months) and for all workers (total number of workers with earnings in 
the quarter). Not surprising, the earnings level coefficients on the triple-diff variable produce point 
estimates that are effectively zero. For employment, the point estimates are positive (about 1 percent), but 
the standard errors are large enough to limit any confidence we might have in these results. That said, 
estimates of positive employment level effects of about 1 percent reinforce our confidence in the 
conclusion that CPFL did not reduce overall employment among young women.  
Having seen results for earnings and employment levels, we now turn to their flow counterparts. 
Table 6 presents our primary triple difference specifications with roughly a half million county-by-
quarter-by-demographic observations. The three specifications shown differ only in the choice of fixed 
effects. The results shown in Panel A separately include county, demographic and quarter fixed effects. 
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Panel B reports the full specification with county-by-demographic and quarter fixed effects. Panel C 
reports results with county-by-demographic, quarter-by-demographic and state-by-quarter fixed effects. 
Results are similar across these three specifications as well as in other unreported specifications that 
include different combinations of geographic, demographic, and time fixed effects. Unlike the simpler 
double difference results in Table 3, these large set of fixed effects are able to account both for changes 
during this time period that are unique to California and for changes occurring to earnings and 
employment flows of young women relative to other groups that are common across states. Importantly, 
Panels B and C include county-demographic fixed effects which account for any time-invariant 
differences in the unit of observation. Thus the impact of CPFL in these specifications is identified solely 
off changes that occur within a county-demographic group over time. Given the similarity of the results in 
Panels A, B and C, we focus attention below on Panel C of Table 6. 
Column 1 of Panel C shows new hire earnings effects that are essentially zero. The coefficient of 
two-tenths of one percent combined with the small standard errors suggest that the policy had a minimal 
impact on the earnings of young female new hires, the group for whom you would most likely see an 
impact. The minimal wage effect is likely to reflect some combination of weak disruption costs among 
employers from CPFL (i.e., small demand shifts) and reasonably integrated labor markets in which young 
women receive wages similar to those of other similarly productive workers.  
While the impact on new hire earnings is minimal there are more noticeable impacts on worker 
flows. CPFL is shown to increase new hires by an estimated 3 percent, separations by 2.4 percent, and 
recalls (extended leaves) by 2.9 percent. These findings are statistically and quantitatively significant and 
suggest that the CPFL had substantive labor markets impacts, outcomes that cannot be observed when 
focusing only on employment levels. We interpret these findings below. 
8.3  Discussion of results 
The results from our preferred specifications have implications for our understanding of the labor 
market effects of CPFL. First, we find a very limited impact of the program on young women’s earnings. 
Point estimates show a very small earnings impact for newly hired young women. Although the 
confidence interval includes zero, the point estimate is precisely estimated and precludes the possibility 
that the program had large negative effects on young women’s earnings. These small earnings estimates 
fall in line with our back-of-the-envelope calculation that found that even with full wage shifting, large 
earnings impacts were unlikely given the limited size of the program.  
Although wage effects for young women were expected to be minimal, finding an increase in new 
hires among young women was initially surprising. Standard theory could explain employment increases 
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as resulting from large increases in young women’s labor supply owing to a high valuation of PFL, but 
such supply increases should have decreased relative wages, which we do not observe. As discussed 
earlier, a close-to-zero wage effect can be reconciled with theory given that the tax costs of CPFL are 
borne by all California workers and is independent of establishment-level usage of paid leave, particularly 
so if coupled with the assumption that non-tax disruption costs of leave are modest and that young female 
workers within California (at the margin) are close substitutes for other new hires. 
A substantial increase in young female new hires and a small increase in employment levels is 
better understood once we examine separations and recalls, both increasing substantially following 
implementation of CPFL. The finding that extended leaves (i.e., recalls) increased following CPFL is 
consistent with previous findings from Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) that indicate increased leave time for 
women as a result of mandated paid leave. CPFL appears to have enabled some women with young 
children to substantially increase their time off from work beyond the period of mandated paid leave and, 
in many cases, return to their same employer following extended leaves. This is a notable outcome given 
that CPFL does not provide job protection beyond what was previously available through state law and 
the FMLA.30 In addition to longer leave, our results suggest that more efficiency-enhancing job churn 
may be occurring. If young women were previously staying in jobs that, apart from their paid leave 
policy, were an inferior match, the provision of universal paid leave reduced job lock and allowed 
workers to find better job matches.  
9. Placebo policy tests of earnings, employment, separation, and recalls  
As a robustness check on our results, we replicate the triple-difference model shown in Panel B of 
Table 7 (with county-demographic and quarter fixed effects ), but this time remove the California data 
and “replace” it with nine alternative placebo treatment groups of states grouped geographically. For each 
set of placebo tests, data from placebo states are excluded from the control group. The results are shown 
in Table 7 for new hire earnings, new hires, separations, and recalls. These placebo policy tests allow us 
to assess the reliability of our California estimates. Small and insignificant estimates for all or at least 
most of the placebo policies would provide a valuable falsification test. A systematic set of results that 
either mimics those for California or that is highly noisy and produces numerous estimates that are large 
and/or statistically significant would suggest that our data and empirical approach may not be sufficiently 
reliable to identify the impact of CPFL. 
The first row shows the treatment effect estimates for California previously reported in Panel B of 
Table 6. The bottom row presents the unweighted means of the placebo estimates across the nine sets of 
                                                 
30 Lalive et al. (2014) conclude that leave with job protection has been important in Austria. 
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estimates. We verify that the means of each of the four sets of placebo estimates are effectively zero, as 
expected. Our focus, however, is on variation in the estimates and the presence of numerically and 
statistically significant estimates. 
We first examine estimates for new hire earnings, where we previously obtained a near-zero 
estimate for California. Most of the placebo results for new hire earnings produce coefficients that are 
larger in absolute value than our California estimates. Four of the coefficients are statistically significant, 
with one having a reasonably large negative sign and three a positive coefficient of about 1 percent. Six of 
the nine results are statistically insignificant and tiny in magnitude. We previously argued that theory 
suggests a tiny wage effect from CPFL and that our empirical estimates of new hire wage effects were not 
clear-cut. Results from our placebo tests reinforce this latter conclusion. Although we believe that the 
causal wage effects from CPFL are negative but small, available data and methods are insufficiently 
powerful to confirm (or reject) such a belief.  
The placebo tests on worker flow variables provide more encouraging results. For the new hire 
employment regressions, where we obtained a highly significant 3 percent treatment effect estimate, no 
placebo estimate is large or significant. These results strongly reinforce our conclusion that CPFL led to 
substantial increases in young female new hires. Such a result, however, is only plausible if there is 
increased churn in the labor market, as suggested by our results on separations and recalls. For 
separations, we find three significant or marginally significant coefficients among the nine placebo tests, 
two negative and one positive. No coefficient is as large as the 0.025 estimate for California. For the 
recall results, there is only one out of nine significant estimates, this one a large 0.04 estimate for a group 
of Midwestern states. Six of the nine placebo coefficients are negative and three positive.  
Overall, the placebo test results suggest that while the QWI is well suited for analyzing the effects 
of workplace mandates on hires, separations, and recalls, it is not powerful enough to unambiguously 
distinguish between small wage effects of, say, 1 or 1.5 percent. Although the causal new hire wage 
impacts from CPFL are too small to measure with any degree of certainty, we regard our small negative 
estimates as plausible given theory. In contrast to the earnings results, the placebo tests enhance 
confidence in our conclusion that there were substantive increases in labor market churn following CPFL, 
with hiring, separations, and recalls increasing among young women.  
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10. Conclusion 
Employer mandates are likely to have small effects. Nonwage benefits highly valued by workers 
relative to their costs are those most likely to be voluntarily provided by employers (with costs shifted to 
workers). Benefits that have substantial costs relative to worker valuation are those least likely to be 
mandated through the political process. Mandated worker benefits not provided voluntarily, but politically 
viable, are likely to have modest or offsetting benefits and costs.  
Unfortunately, most data sets are incapable of accurately identifying small or modest causal 
effects from employer mandates. Household data sets such as the CPS have small sample sizes of 
individuals by geographic location by time period. Establishment data, on the other hand, rarely provide 
the demographic and geographic breakdown needed to analyze mandates that differentially impact 
alternative groups of workers. More fundamentally, wages and employment across demographic groups 
or within businesses change gradually. Incumbent workers are not likely to have their pay reduced 
substantially, nor will businesses quickly alter the demographic make-up of their trained workforces 
through dismissals. The margin for which one is most likely to observe wage and employment 
adjustments in response to an employer mandate is with respect to new hires, both through changes in 
their demographic composition and in the wages offered, as well as changes in other worker flows. 
The Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) data set provides a relatively new and underutilized 
resource that lends itself to evaluation of public policies that differentially affect employment and/or 
earnings with respect to time, location, and demographic group. Particularly appealing is QWI’s provision 
of data on the number and earnings of stable (not short-term) new hires, margins over which labor market 
adjustments are most likely to occur. We believe that this type of analysis strengthens and improves our 
understanding of the impact of CPFL, and provides promise for future labor market policy analyses. 
Although we have emphasized the benefits of this data set, we also acknowledge its limits. First, 
the QWI contains only data on earnings and not wages. There are no measures of hours worked and so 
interpreting the change in earnings as a change in wages can only be done under the assumption that 
hours remain unchanged. Indeed, the noise exhibited in our new hire earnings results may result in part 
from changes in hours worked that weaken the signal on underlying hourly wage changes. Second, while 
examining flows allows for the detection of small changes to labor markets, there may be shifts in the 
composition of the newly hired (and separating) workers (say, with respect to education) that occur as a 
result of the policy. If a policy encourages a different type of worker to join or leave the firm, earnings 
estimates may be biased. We doubt that this latter issue is a major concern with respect to CPFL. In short, 
the analysis performed here comes with a tradeoff. The data used in previous studies (e.g., the CPS and 
SIPP) contain far fewer observations but are better able to measure and control for individual-level 
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earnings, hours, and worker attributes, as well as family information. While we are unable to include 
controls at the individual or household level, our data do contain the universe of all private sector worker 
flows and relies on a large set of fixed effects to control for demographic and geographic differences.  
California’s mandatory paid family leave policy, a first in the U.S., effectively added six weeks of 
partially paid leave to new mothers (or fathers). Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) and other studies indicate that 
CPFL led to increased time off among mothers with infants. Our analysis concludes that CPFL resulted in 
little change in earnings for young women in California, coupled with increased churn in the form of 
separations, extended leaves, and hires. Part of this increased churn is likely the result of reduced job lock 
and enhanced job matching made possible by universal paid family leave. The results of our study suggest 
that there may be substantive benefits from mandated paid leave, with little apparent efficiency loss and 
possibly an efficiency gain. Blau and Kahn (2013) note the U.S. reversal in female labor force 
participation, being ranked sixth out of 22 OECD countries in 1990 but 17th of 22 in 2010. They suggest 
that a general lack of family-friendly policies in the U.S., as compared to other developed economies, 
helps explain this change. Our finding that increased hiring, separations, and extended leaves among 
young women followed California’s adoption of paid family leave is consistent with such a conclusion.  
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Figure 1: Timeline for Maximum Use of Disability Insurance and  
Paid Family Leave in California 
 
Notes: See text for discussion and greater detail. Acronyms shown are: 
SDI: California State Disability Insurance 
CPFL: California Paid Family Leave 
PDL: California Pregnancy Disability Leave 
CFRA: California Family Rights Act 
FMLA: Family Medical and Leave Act (federal) 
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Figure 2: Wage-Employment Effects of CPFL in California with Separate Markets for Young Women and Other Workers 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on California Paid State Disability Insurance (SDI) and Paid Family Leave (PFL) 
SDI/PFL claims and benefits FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 
Total SDI pregnancy claims paid 172,623 175,194 183,013 189,139 181,685 169,957 168,593 
SDI claims transitioning to PFL bonding claims 
  
108,818 115,392 119,442 111,024 127,529 
Estimated PFL/SDI share 
  
0.655 0.631 0.636 0.614 0.655 
Average weekly benefit, SDI pregnancy claims 
  
$354 $368 $382 $397 $398 
Average weeks, SDI pregnancy claims 
  
11.97 10.43 10.43 10.50 10.70 
Average weekly benefit, PFL claims  $409 $432 $441 $457 $472 $488 $488 
Average weeks per PFL claim 4.84 5.32 5.37 5.35 5.39 5.37 5.30 
Total PFL claims filed 150,514 160,988 174,838 192,494 197,638 190,743 204,893 
Total PFL claims paid 139,593 153,446 165,967 182,834 187,889 180,675 194,777 
Total PFL benefits paid* $300.42 $349.33 $387.88 $439.49 $472.11 $468.79 $498.44 
% of PFL claims filed for bonding 87.7% 87.8% 87.6% 87.6% 88.8% 87.8% 87.3% 
number of bonding claims filed by women 109,566 112,631 119,893 129,986 132,958 123,632 128,774 
% of bonding claims filed by women 83.0% 79.7% 78.3% 77.1% 75.8% 73.8% 72.0% 
CY SDI/PFL tax, contribution, benefit rules CY 2000 CY 2001 CY 2002 CY 2003 CY 2004 CY 2005 CY 2006 
Contribution rate 0.65% 0.70% 0.90% 0.90% 1.18% 1.08% 0.80% 
Taxable wage ceiling $46,327 $46,327 $46,327 $56,916 $68,829 $79,418 $79,418 
Maximum worker contribution $324 $324 $417 $512 $812 $858 $635 
Maximum weekly benefits $490 $490 $490 $603 $728 $840 $840 
 CY 2007 CY 2008 CY 2009 CY 2010 CY 2011 
  
Contribution rate 0.60% 0.80% 1.10% 1.10% 1.20% 
  
Taxable wage ceiling $83,389 $86,698 $90,669 $93,316 $93,316 
  
Maximum worker contribution $500 $693 $997 $1,026 $1,120 
  
Maximum weekly benefits $882 $917 $959 $987 $987 
  
* dollar amounts are in millions        
Source: Data were compiled by authors from data provided on the website and by an analyst at the State of California, Employment Development Department. 
Some but not all of these figures could be updated beyond 2011. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Evidence on QWI New Hire Earnings, Employment, Separations, and Recalls, Pre- and Post-CPFL 
 
  New Hire Earnings (monthly) New Hires Separations Recalls 
 
Panel A Pre-CPFL Post-CPFL log diff Pre-CPFL Post-CPFL log diff Pre-CPFL Post-CPFL log diff Pre-CPFL Post-CPFL log diff 
California 
          
  
 
young women $2,103.90 $2,159.11 0.0175 1,845,795 2,031,023 0.0662 1,932,557 2,097,887 0.0519 226,268 222,909 -0.0434 
 
young men $2,635.24 $2,718.63 0.0238 2,049,899 2,194,502 0.0310 2,156,837 2,230,928 -0.0046 275,433 260,816 -0.0951 
 
older women $2,662.68 $2,797.84 0.0452 1,471,218 1,566,733 0.0486 1,855,683 1,912,756 0.0150 340,356 318,617 -0.0738 
 
older men $4,167.40 $4,382.52 0.0472 1,744,367 1,849,186 0.0413 2,314,796 2,342,634 -0.0051 451,588 439,552 -0.0495 
 
all workers $2,878.84 $2,988.81 0.0307 7,111,279 7,641,444 0.0435 8,259,873 8,584,205 0.0096 1,293,645 1,241,894 -0.0631 
“All” states except CA  
          
 
 
 
young women $1,822.91 $1,850.56 0.0102 12,615,073 14,191,164 0.0622 13,912,593 15,139,958 0.0247 2,027,650 1,942,783 -0.0751 
 
young men $2,452.88 $2,505.65 0.0146 13,105,511 14,766,798 0.0558 14,476,115 15,547,222 0.0054 2,419,342 2,295,372 -0.0955 
 
older women $2,342.19 $2,411.69 0.0263 10,097,368 11,458,987 0.0672 13,689,056 14,521,109 0.0007 3,105,352 2,967,092 -0.0674 
 
older men $3,981.32 $4,086.40 0.0247 11,019,371 12,566,936 0.0695 15,622,413 16,303,978 -0.0136 3,849,258 3,686,245 -0.0703 
 
all workers $2,618.94 $2,684.80 0.0218 46,837,323 52,983,885 0.0623 57,700,177 61,512,267 -0.0005 11,401,602 10,891,492 -0.0734 
 
  Relative New Hire Earnings New Hire Share Separations Share Recall Share 
  Panel B  Pre-CPFL Post-CPFL diff Pre-CPFL Post-CPFL diff Pre-CPFL Post-CPFL diff Pre-CPFL Post-CPFL diff 
California 
     
 
      
 
young women 0.7308 0.7224 -0.0084 0.2596 0.2658 0.0062 0.2340 0.2444 0.0104 0.1749 0.1795 0.0046 
 
young men 0.9154 0.9096 -0.0058 0.2883 0.2872 -0.0011 0.2611 0.2599 -0.0012 0.2129 0.2100 -0.0029 
 
older women 0.9249 0.9361 0.0112 0.2069 0.2050 -0.0019 0.2247 0.2228 -0.0018 0.2631 0.2566 -0.0065 
 
older men 1.4476 1.4663 0.0187 0.2453 0.2420 -0.0033 0.2802 0.2729 -0.0073 0.3491 0.3539 0.0049 
“All” states except CA  
  
 
     
 
  
 
 
young women 0.6961 0.6893 -0.0068 0.2693 0.2678 -0.0015 0.2411 0.2461 0.0050 0.1778 0.1784 0.0005 
 
young men 0.9366 0.9333 -0.0033 0.2798 0.2787 -0.0011 0.2509 0.2527 0.0019 0.2122 0.2107 -0.0014 
  older women 0.8943 0.8983 0.0039 0.2156 0.2163 0.0007 0.2372 0.2361 -0.0012 0.2724 0.2724 0.0001 
  older men 1.5202 1.5220 0.0018 0.2353 0.2372 0.0019 0.2708 0.2651 -0.0057 0.3376 0.3385 0.0008 
In addition to excluding California, the “All” states group does not include Arizona, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and New Hampshire.  Young women and men are ages 19-34 and older 
women and men are ages 35-65. All ratios and shares include values for all workers in the denominator and values for the identified group (e.g., young women) in the numerator. Log differences are 
calculated using the mean of the logged county-by-quarter values and not the log of the means, consistent with the regression analysis. Earnings are in 2010 dollars. 
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Table 3: CPFL Diff-in-Diff Effects on Earnings and Labor Market Flows of 
California Young Women using Within-State Comparison to Other Workers  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
ln(NH Earn) ln(New Hires) ln(Seps) ln(Recalls) 
Panel A: Older Women Comparison 
Post x Young Fem  -0.0204*** 0.0141  0.0380*** 0.0386*** 
 
(0.0060) (0.0125) (0.0103) (0.0112) 
Observations 5,422  5,455  5,462  5,365  
R2 0.983  0.998  0.997  0.979  
Panel B: Younger Men Comparison 
Post x Young Fem  -0.0128** 0.0240* 0.0439*** 0.0414*** 
 
(0.0050) (0.0142) (0.0130) (0.0146) 
Observations 5,413  5,444  5,447  5,314  
R2 0.990  0.998  0.998  0.984  
Panel C: All Demographic Comparison 
Post x Young Fem -0.0173*** 0.0186* 0.0468*** 0.0276** 
 
(0.0041) (0.0105) (0.0090) (0.0109) 
Observations 10,841  10,916  10,939  10,713  
Adjusted R2 0.986  0.997  0.996  0.979 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Analysis is at the county-by-quarter-by demographic 
level within California. Robust standard errors in parentheses. SE are clustered at the 
County-Dem level. County, Dem, and Quarter FE are included. 
 
 
 
Table 4: CPFL Diff-in-Diff Effects on Earnings and Labor Market Flows of 
California Young Women, with Other-State Young Women Comparison 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
ln(NH Earn) ln(New Hires) ln(Seps) ln(Recalls) 
Post x CA 0.0130*** 0.0053  0.0281*** 0.0324*** 
 
(0.0036) (0.0090) (0.0081) (0.0121) 
Observations 128,954 131,434  132,789  115,474  
R2 0.970 0.996 0.996  0.958  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Analysis is at the county-by-quarter-level across all 
states in sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. SE are clustered at the county level. 
County and Quarter FE are used. 
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Table 5: CPFL Effects on Earnings and Employment Levels Rather than Flows: Triple Diff 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
ln(Earn Stable) ln(Earn All) ln(Emp Stable) ln(Emp All) 
Panel A: County, Dem, and Quarter FE 
Post x  CA x Young Fem 0.0022 0.0036 0.0156 0.0151 
 
(0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0108) (0.0108) 
Observations 560,862 560,859 560,862 560,863 
R2 0.965 0.962 0.994 0.994 
Panel B: County-Dem, Dem-Quarter, and State-Quarter FE 
Post x CA x Young Fem 0.0032 0.0049 0.0133 0.0124 
 
(0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0108) (0.0108) 
Observations 560,862 560,859 560,862 560,863 
R2 0.988 0.962 0.999 0.999 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Analysis is at the county-by-quarter-by demographic level 
across all states in sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the County-
Dem level. Panel A contains separate county, demographic, and quarter FE. Panel B, the largest 
model we are able to run contains the County-Dem, Dem-Quarter, and State-Quarter two-way FE. 
We estimate the model on “stable” employment, defined as workers who have worked at the firm 
for at least 3 months and on “all” (i.e. point-in-time) employment.  
Table 6: CPFL Effects on Earnings and Labor Flows of Young Women: Triple Diff 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
ln(NH Earn) ln(New Hires) ln(Seps) ln(Recalls) 
Panel A: County, Dem, and Quarter FE 
Post x CA x Young Fem  -0.0021 0.0325*** 0.0257*** 0.0300** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0107) (0.0094) (0.0145) 
Observations 515,501 528,511 528,133 476,992 
R2 0.927 0.990 0.988 0.946 
Panel B: County-Dem and Quarter FE 
Post x CA x Young Fem -0.0015 0.0310*** 0.0241*** 0.0294** 
 
(0.0043) (0.0109) (0.0095) (0.0148) 
Observations 515,501 528,511 528,133 476,992 
R2 0.963 0.995 0.993 0.950 
Panel C: County-Dem, Dem-Quarter, and State-Quarter FE 
Post x CA x Young Fem -0.00215 0.0304*** 0.0236*** 0.0295*** 
 
(0.0032) (0.0088) (0.0073) (0.0118) 
N 515,501 528,511 528,133 476,992 
R2 0.967 0.996 0.995 0.966 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Analysis is at the county-by-quarter-by demographic level 
across all states in sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the County-
Dem level. Panel A contains separate county, demographic, and quarter FE. Panel B contains 
county-demographic FE and quarter FE. Panel C, the largest model we are able to run contains the 
County-Demographic, Demographic-Quarter and State-Quarter two-way FE.  
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Table 7: Labor Market Outcome Estimates from State Group Placebo Policies  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
ln(NH Earn) ln(New Hires) ln(Seps) ln(Recalls) 
CA -0.0015 0.0310*** 0.0241*** 0.0294** 
Placebo Groups:     
ME VT NY CT RI NJ 0.0085 0.0147 0.0100 0.0219 
PA DE WV OH MI 0.0039 -0.00746 -0.0053 0.0163 
IN KY TN IL MO 0.0032 0.0059 -0.0092 -0.0118 
WI MN IA ND SD NE -0.0105** -0.00946 -0.0117 0.0256 
MT ID WY WA OR 0.0072** -0.0058 0.0027 -0.0086 
MD DC VA NC SC 0.0088*** 0.0016 0.0084 -0.0086 
GA FL AL  0.000002 0.00668 0.0192* -0.0303 
LA TX OK -0.0171*** -0.0130 -0.0051 -0.0218 
AZ NM NV UT CO -0.0002 -0.0094 -0.0173 -0.0075 
Mean placebo estimates 0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0034 -0.0028 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first line provides CPFL estimates shown previously 
in Table 6, Panel B. We report above placebo results in which groups of states (clustered 
geographically and roughly similar in size to California) are designated as the treated area. 
The last line provides unweighted means of the placebo estimates. Not included in the 
placebo state groups are Arizona, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and New 
Hampshire, which had incomplete LEHD records during the years of study, and Alaska 
and Hawaii, which are not geographically close to other states. 
 
